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Motivations
Why we did it …
• Stay current on latest CC developments
• Prepare for a new course on security 
requirements engineering
• Determine effectiveness of learning-by-doing as 
applied to the CC





• Sponsor needs shared printing capability in 
multilevel environment
• Use CC framework to establish security 
requirements for dedicated MPS
– Draft PP based on CC Version 2.2 – Masters thesis
• TOE description
• Threats (16), assumptions (8), OSPs (6)
• Security objectives – TOE (24), IT environment (9)
• SFRs – TOE (9 Classes),  IT environment (1 Class)
• SARs – EAL4 with augmentation
– Draft PP lacks
• Traceability analysis & rationale description 
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TOE Description




 MLS Print Server    Handle print jobs of different sensitivity levels
Utilize Separation Kernel technology
 Single-level clients Sensitivity levels determined by attached interface 
 Printers Located on system high network, physically protected
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TOE  Components
 Trusted base Hardware, Separation Kernel
 Trusted partitions 
Runtime (TSF) MLS Services, System High Services
Initialization




















CC Version 2.2 Æ CC Version 3.0
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Objectives, Approach & Progress
Objectives
• Complete translation of SFRs
• Partial translation of SARs
• Provide hands-on experience for team member unfamiliar 
with CC
Approach




• First pass only – translated requirements still sketchy











FAU_SAR Æ FDP_ACC, FAU_SAR_EXP
FAU_SEL Æ FDP_ACC, FAU_SEL_EXP
FAU_STG Æ FDP_ACC, FAU_STG_EXP
 FAU_ARP, FAU_GEN, FAU_SAA
– Translation was straightforward 
 FAU_SAR, FAU_SEL, FAU_STG
– Required more work
– Used FDP_ACC to control ability to review data, select auditable events, 
protect audit trail




FAU_SAR.1.1:  The TSF shall provide the security administrator with the 
capability to read all audit information from the audit records
FAU_SAR.1.2:  Refinement:  The TSF shall provide the audit records in a 
manner suitable for the security administrator to interpret the 
information using a tool to access the audit trail.
FDP_ACC.1.1:  Access control for audit review
The TSF shall allow an operation of a subject on an object if and only if 
all of the following hold:
a)  The role attribute of the subject is security. 
b)  The type of the object is audit record in the audit trail.
c)  The subject has read access to the object.
FAU_SAR_EXP.1.1:  Security audit review support
The TSF shall provide the audit records in a form suitable for 











Challenges with FDP_IFC and FDP_IFF translation
 Separation Kernel enforces both information flow and MAC policies
– Kernel configuration data defines policies
 MLS Services enforces MAC supporting policy for print job labeling
– Map sensitivity level of jobs based on level of spooler partition











 Mostly straight forward translation
 A lesson on indirect dependencies 
– E.g., FIA_AFL indirectly depends on FIA_URE because of FIA_UAU
 Dependency tables in Annex A were utilized







FMT_MTD Æ FDP_ACC, FDP_MSA, FPT_RSA
FMT_SAE Æ FDP_ACC, FDP_MSA
FMT_SMF Æ FDP_ACC, FDP_MSA
FMT_SMR Æ FDP_ACC, FDP_MSA, FIA_USB
 No FMT in V3.0 -- Most dreaded part of the exercise
 General mapping rules
– Use FDP_ACC for restricting ability to perform certain function
– Use FDP_MSA for managing functions related to security attributes




FMT_MTD.2.1:  The TSF shall restrict the specification of the limits for print 
jobs sent to the printer to the security administrator.
FDP_ACC.1.3:  Management of print job limits
The TSF shall allow an operation of a subject on an object if and only if all of 
the following hold:
a) The role attribute of the subject is security administrator.
b) The type of the object is print job.
c) The operation is to specify the limits for print jobs sent to the printer.
FDP_MSA.1.3:  Management of print job limits
The TSF shall determine if a subject is allowed to change the limits of print 
jobs sent to the printer or not, as follows:
a) The role attribute of the subject is security administrator.




FMT_MTD.2.2:  The TSF shall take the following actions, if the TSF data are at 
or exceed, the indicated limits:  <list of actions>
FPT_RSA.1:  Resource allocation (print job limits)
FTP_RSA.1.1:   The TSF shall enforce maximum quotas for print jobs 
that a subject can use over a specified period of time.
FPT_RSA.1.2:   The TSF shall take the following actions when a 






• Base requirements for EAL 4
• Extended requirements include
– Flaw remediation procedures
– Assurance maintenance plan
– Administrative guidance regarding proper setting of 
configuration data
• MAC enforcement:  SK configuration data
• MAC supporting:  MPS configuration data




• No specific translation
– Project stopped before getting to SARs
• V3.0 ADV requirements were reviewed for a 
different project (SKPP)
– Provided comments to US scheme
• TOE relies on evaluated separation kernel
– Composition challenge: Allocation of mandatory and 
supporting policies among TOE components
• US Precedent PD-0117 facilitated several 
decisions in original PP
• Class ACO is not as expected





• Validated general assessments of CC V3.0 
– New functional paradigm not ready for general 
use
– Difficult to express TOE security behavior
– Correct usage of FDP_ACC was difficult to 
determine
• Ordering of classes/families was hard to 
navigate if not already familiar with CC
• “V3.0 transition” document was helpful
– Example of translated PP/ST would be better
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Other Observations
• Team lost momentum/interest after CC V3.1 news
– Part 2 is back to V2.3 with minor changes
• Project took longer than expected
– Conducted as a teaching exercise
– Steep learning curve for novice team member
– Worked as time allowed  Æ high overhead revving up
• 20/20 hindsight: high-level translation might be 
better than rote
• Cyclical learning-by-doing methodology was 
effective 
Task definition




• 3 out of 4 objectives met
√ Stay current on latest CC developments 
√ Prepare for a new course on security 
requirements engineering
√ Determine effectiveness of learning-by-
doing as applied to the CC
• Future work to meet sponsored program 
requirements
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